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F or most economists, “Dutch disease” refers to the problems that economies often face in their manufacturing or export sector when there is a sharp increase in the development of energy or other natural resources. The phrase 
originally referred to how the manufacturing sector of the Netherlands was adversely 
affected by discoveries of natural gas in the late 1950s and has become a catch-all 
term for the difficulties experienced by many economies with high levels of natural 
resource exports. But for many European labor economists, “Dutch disease” also 
has another meaning. It refers to the fact that the share of those in the Netherlands 
who received disability benefits tripled from 4 percent of those who were insured in 
the late 1960s to about 12 percent of those who were insured in the mid-1980s—and 
then remained more or less constant at this unprecedented level until the beginning 
of the 21st century. As recently as 15 years ago, this high level of Disability Insurance 
(DI) enrollment was considered to be one of the major social and economic prob-
lems of the Netherlands; indeed, the Netherlands was characterized as the country 
with the most out-of-control disability program of OECD countries (Burkhauser, 
Daly, and de Jong 2008).
But since about 2002, the Netherlands has seen a spectacular decline in its 
Disability Insurance enrollment rate. Figure 1 shows the rise and fall. The share of 
the insured population receiving Disability Insurance decreased from 11 percent 
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in 2001 to 7.2 percent in 2012. Similarly, the Disability Insurance award rates—that 
is, the share of the insured population that started to receive disability payments 
in a given year—declined from 1.5 percent in 2001 to about 0.5 percent in 2012. 
Also, spending on disability programs in the Netherlands halved from 4.2 percent 
of the GDP in 1990 to 2.1 percent in 2007 (OECD 2010). This rate of spending on 
disability benefits is lower than in comparable countries like Sweden (2.2 percent of 
GDP) and Norway (2.5 percent). In recent years, the number of disability beneficia-
ries per worker in the Netherlands has decreased below the level of the beneficiaries 
per worker for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Secu-
rity Income (SSI) in the United States.
A first question we address is what aspects of the program contributed to the 
increase of the disability rolls in the Netherlands until 2002. In brief, the disability 
program was set up in a way that caused it to function as an attractive substitute 
pathway into unemployment insurance for both workers and employers. Indeed, 
from the perspective of workers, DI benefit conditions remained generous until 
Figure 1 
Disability Insurance Award and Enrollment Rates per Insured Worker in the 
Netherlands, 1968–2012
Source: UWV (2012).
Note: The Disability Insurance award rate is the share of the insured population that started to receive 
disability payments in a given year.
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2006, particularly compared to the benefits that could be received from unem-
ployment insurance and social assistance benefit schemes. Similarly, during that 
time, employers had reason to prefer that some of their workers would be awarded 
disability benefits instead of unemployment benefits because in the Netherlands 
this avoided substantial firing costs. In the context of the Netherlands’ broad 
disability scheme, which insures all workers against all income losses due to both 
occupational and nonoccupational injuries, workers and employers had ample 
opportunities to take advantage of the system. The disability scheme came to func-
tion like a long-term program for workers who were less employable rather than 
being restricted to those having substantial health problems.
Next we turn to reforms of the disability system in the Netherlands undertaken 
from 1996 to 2006. We cluster these reforms in three broad categories: 1) reducing 
the incentives of employers to move workers to disability; 2) increased gatekeeping; 
and 3)  tightening disability eligibility criteria while enhancing worker incentives. 
As we will show, changes in the screening process and increased employer incen-
tives have both contributed to a substantial decrease in inflows to disability benefits. 
However, changes in the duration and level of disability insurance benefits have had 
less effect. As it turns out, a key to the Dutch disability insurance reform has been 
transferring certain costs and responsibilities to employers, thus changing their 
incentives. In the Dutch system, workers are first placed on sick leave for two years 
before they become eligible for disability benefits. During that time, employers have 
become responsible for the continued payment of wages for two years of sickness, 
while disability benefit costs are—with some delay—passed on to employers by 
experience-rated premiums.
While these reforms are generally perceived as successful, there is also new 
criticism and concerns regarding some aspects of the current Disability Insurance 
program. The biggest concern is with the high level of sickness and DI risks that are 
transferred to employers, which probably has made employers more reluctant to hire 
workers with discernible health conditions. Although rigorous evidence in this direc-
tion is still limited, we will discuss whether employers have increased the screening 
and sorting of such workers. Related to this point, we should highlight the increased 
DI  inflow rates of workers with flexible and/or temporary jobs. For these jobs, 
the DI benefit costs are not passed on to employers on an experience-rated basis.
Putting the Dutch Disability Insurance reforms in a broader perspective, a perti-
nent question is whether the dramatic decrease in the inflow rate to disability benefits 
was accompanied by increased employment rates, or whether those who would have 
been identified as disabled just ended up in other public support programs. To shed 
more light on these issues, we use survey data on the health status of individuals 
to investigate how differences in employment rates between people with good and 
bad health has evolved since the disability reforms took place. In light of the stricter 
eligibility criteria for disability that resulted from the reforms, it is likely that workers 
with bad health conditions are awarded DI benefits less frequently in the new 
scheme. According to the data, the reforms probably enhanced the work continu-
ation of male workers with poor health to some extent. From this perspective, one 
154     Journal of Economic Perspectives
may conclude that distortion in the labor supply of workers has decreased. At the 
same time, however, the share of unhealthy workers without work and receiving no 
disability benefits has increased. It thus is hard to infer whether the reforms in sum 
have contributed to the targeting efficiency of the DI program.
In the final section, we briefly summarize the main lessons that can be drawn 
from the reforms and discuss the major challenges the Dutch Disability Insurance 
system is facing in the years to come. Regarding the design of disability reforms 
in comparable industrialized countries, probably the most important lesson is that 
employers should be stimulated and facilitated in finding ways to prevent long-term 
sickness and absence, and subsequent disability inflow. The experiences with inten-
sified gatekeeping during the sickness period show that employers can be pushed to 
take on this role. Indeed, the success of the Dutch disability reforms largely depends 
on the use of early interventions when a worker becomes sick, in the waiting period 
before they enter the disability rolls. At some point, however, employer obligations 
may become too sizeable, raising questions about the ability of employers to influ-
ence DI risks. Also if the obligations are too large, there is the risk that employers 
will try to evade incentives created by this kind of disability program reform.
Disability Insurance in the Netherlands
Since 1967, the Disability Insurance program in the Netherlands has been 
provided as a public scheme that is mandatory for all workers. Disability benefits 
are provided if workers experience a loss of income capacity due to medical impair-
ments of 35 percent or more.1 For these workers, benefits provide insurance for 
70  percent of the loss of income due to impairments. Since 2004, workers can 
apply for disability benefits after two years of sickness. During the so-called “waiting 
period,” employers are responsible for the provision of reintegration activities 
(services and/or adaptations that facilitate the worker’s return to work), and for the 
continued payment of wages. Disability insurance claims are assessed and premiums 
are set by the public social benefit administration called the UWV (Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekeringen), which roughly translates as Employee Insurance Agency. 
The UWV determines the presence of impairments, the consequences for the 
earnings potential of an applicant, the degree of disability as a percentage of 
the worker’s former wage, and the corresponding disability benefit level. Workers 
may thus receive benefits for partial disability, which are supplemented by unem-
ployment insurance benefits—and subsequently by social assistance benefits—if 
the residual earnings potential is not used sufficiently. Figure 2 shows that in 2013, 
71 percent of all disability benefit recipients were classified as 100 percent disabled 
and thus received full disability benefits, whereas workers with 15 to 35 percent loss of 
earning capacity—constituting 10 percent of all recipients—were the second-largest 
1 For workers with residual capacities, a set of regular jobs is selected that meet the worker’s physical and 
mental impairments. Based on the wage rates of these jobs, the residual earnings capacity is determined.
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group. It should be noted that the threshold value for disability benefits was raised 
from 15 to 35 percent in 2006. Thus, workers with a disability degree that is lower 
than 35 percent entered the scheme before 2006.
The Dutch Disability Insurance system has two important institutional features 
that differ from systems in most other high-income countries. These features haven’t 
changed much since inception in 1967, not even after the reforms that started in 
the late 1990s. First, the Dutch disability program covers all workers against all 
income losses that result from both occupational and nonoccupational injuries. In 
most other high-income countries, eligibility for disability insurance is constrained 
by work history requirements or limited to occupational injuries only. Including all 
workers against the whole gamut of medical contingencies increases the possibility 
of sizable screening errors in disability determinations (as discussed, for example, in 
Parsons 1991) where the social benefit administration is more likely to prioritize on 
minimizing erroneous denials (“Type I errors”) at the cost of increasing erroneous 
admissions (“Type 2 errors”). Clearly, the sharp rise of disability enrollment in the 
Netherlands for two decades after the mid-1960s and the continued high levels of 
disability for two decades after that suggests that applicants have in the past success-
fully exploited this feature of the Disability Insurance system (Burkhauser, Daly, and 
de Jong 2008).
Second, wage payments for sick workers are continued in the waiting period 
that precedes disability claims. This scheme was funded from sectoral insurance 
Figure 2 
Shares of Partially and Fully Disabled DI Benefit Recipients in the Netherlands, 
2013
Source: UWV (2012).
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premiums until 1996, and privatized since then—that is, employers are responsible 
for the continued payment of wages during sickness. Clearly, the Dutch sickness 
benefit scheme differs from the US system, in which individuals who are typically 
no longer working and receiving wages must take the initiative to submit disability 
applications. With continued wage payments during a period of sickness and prior 
to the disability assessment, the Dutch system does not provide strong incentives for 
disabled (or sick) workers to resume work quickly. As a result, workers with less-severe 
health problems are less likely to screen themselves out of DI benefit receipt.
These two main institutional features of Dutch Disability Insurance, with their 
incentives for broad coverage of impairments and limited self-screening, thus laid 
the ground for high Disability Insurance inflow rates after the program’s inception 
in 1967, and, accordingly, a continuous increase of DI enrollment to unprecedented 
levels.2 The relative attractiveness of disability vis-à-vis unemployment insurance 
effectively triggered workers and employers to take advantage of the scheme. 
Compared to unemployment insurance, which also covers 70 percent of the loss of 
income, the Dutch disability system provides benefits with entitlement periods that 
are unrestricted and without the job search requirements that apply to the unem-
ployed. Moreover, statutory disability benefits were (and are) often supplemented 
by nonstatutory benefits for specific collective labor agreements, raising the replace-
ment rate of workers from 70 to 80 or even 90 percent in the first years of receiving 
disability benefits (van Vuren and van Vuuren 2007).
In the past, moving unwanted workers into Disability Insurance rather than 
into unemployment insurance has also been attractive for employers. Until 1996, 
employers did not bear the costs of sick pay and Disability Insurance benefits for their 
own employees. However, if employers fired a worker, especially an older worker 
with a long work history, the employer faced substantial costs. In the Netherlands, 
the general rule applies that each additional year of working history implies one 
extra monthly salary as severance pay. For older workers, this means that the amount 
of severance pay could be equal to three to four years of annual salary. As a result, 
many employers preferred to use disability insurance as a substitute pathway for 
unemployment insurance, even if there was the risk that the disability claim would 
not be awarded at the end of the sickness benefit period. De Jong (2008) concludes 
that the disability insurance scheme has been used in this way to support the trans-
formation from an industrial to a service-oriented economy by facilitating massive 
lay-offs in vulnerable sectors. For many workers in these sectors, disability effectively 
functioned as an early retirement route (Kerkhofs, Lindeboom, and Theeuwes 
1999). Thus, workers and employers had a mutual interest in using the disability 
insurance scheme as a substitute pathway into unemployment and early retirement.
Although the potential for substitution effects between disability and unem-
ployment is self-evident, inferring the actual size of hidden unemployment within 
2 While Dutch Disability Insurance inflow rates have varied substantially over time, DI outflow rates have 
been fairly constant over time, ranging around 11 percent. As a result, only limited variation in DI enroll-
ment rates can be explained by (variation in) DI outflow rates.
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those categorized as disabled is not an easy task. When workers have become inca-
pable of performing their current tasks, either medical or functional criteria may 
predominate. This renders it almost impossible to know if an individual is “hidden 
unemployed”—particularly when someone has entered into the disability insur-
ance scheme only recently and the person’s remaining work opportunities are, as 
yet, undiscovered.
To circumvent these problems, studies of the importance of substitution effects 
between disability and unemployment typically rely on indirect inferences based on 
inflow rates to disability in a given year, or on overall disability enrollment rates, to 
assess the overall size of hidden unemployment. For example, Autor and Duggan 
(2006) point out that application rates for disability insurance are countercyclical—
that is, application rates for disability rise during recessions—while illness is not 
itself directly countercyclical, which suggests substitution effects between disability 
and unemployment insurance. Koning and van Vuuren (2007, 2010) follow a 
similar research strategy for the Netherlands, seeking to explain inflow rates for 
disability and unemployment insurance. Without substitution effects between the 
two insurance programs, average wages and sectoral growth levels should affect 
only the numbers of those receiving unemployment insurance and not the numbers 
receiving disability. However, both these variables do affect inflows to disability 
benefit receipt, and in this way Koning and van Vuuren infer that about one-quarter 
of the inflow into disability insurance from 1993 to 2002 consisted of hidden unem-
ployment. Aarts and de Jong (1992) take an alternative approach. Using medical 
information of disability benefit recipients in the 1980s, they find that hidden 
unemployment among recipients of disability insurance benefits ranges between 
33 and 51 percent.
Assessing the Effectiveness of Disability Policy Reforms
Policymakers in the Netherlands started reforming Disability Insurance in 
the early 1990s, and while these efforts at first seemed promising, these efforts did 
not persist. For example, disability benefits were reduced in 1993; these declines 
were largely offset by (almost) equal increases in supplementary private benefits 
in the following years, leaving the payments to those who were disabled much 
the same. Another step in 1993 was the start of a large-scale program of medical 
re-examinations of existing recipients of disability benefits. These re-examinations 
had a large effect, amounting to a decline in the probability of receiving disability 
benefits of 5  percentage points (Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer 2014). (About 
30 percent of the reduction in disability insurance spending was cancelled out by 
additional spending on unemployment insurance and social assistance.) But these 
measures were not politically sustainable and ended after two years.
However, in the following years, the Dutch government implemented reforms 
that persisted and substantially affected disability inflow rates. We will cluster these 
reforms in three broad categories: 1)  enhancing employer incentives to avoid 
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disability insurance; 2) increasing screening for disability; and 3) tightening eligi-
bility for continued receipt of disability benefits and increasing work incentives 
for recipients.
Enhancing Employer Incentives (1996, 1998)
Starting in 1996, the Dutch government undertook a series of policies to change 
the incentives of employers so they would be less eager to facilitate the movement 
of workers to disability. The idea was that employers should be made responsible 
for a substantial part of the sickness and disability benefit costs of their workers, 
thus encouraging activities that would prevent sickness and disability and reinte-
grate the sick and disabled into the workforce. To start with, the sickness benefit 
program was privatized in 1996, making employers fully responsible for these costs. 
Employers could reinsure this risk with private insurers or bear this risk themselves. 
This change in the program resulted in a decline in absence rates (De Jong and 
Lindeboom 2004).
In 1998, the disability insurance system was experience-rated: that is, the 
amount that employers pay into Disability Insurance was linked to the employers’ 
past experience of employees receiving disability. Specifically, employers were to 
bear the costs of the first five years of Disability Insurance benefits. (In 2006, this 
experience-rating period was extended to ten years.) Initially, the experience-rating 
system did not cause substantial controversy among employers and policymakers. By 
2003, the experience-rating incentive had reached its maximum impact, and about 
31 percent of all disability insurance costs were experience-rated (Koning 2009).
Given that the privatization of sickness pay and the introduction of experience 
rating for disability insurance were the key policy reforms that were taken between 
1996 and 2001, one might conclude that this alteration in employer incentives did 
not make a substantial difference. After all, looking back at Figure 1, the inflow 
rates to receipt of disability benefits varied from 1.1 to 1.4 percent of the insured 
population between 1996 and 2001, which is only a little lower than between 1990 
and 1995. This simple eyeball test would thus suggest that even with a change in 
incentives, employers had limited ability to prevent inflows to the disability rolls.
However, there are strong reasons to believe that the effectiveness of expe-
rience rating increased in later years. Koning (2009) argues that the effects took 
substantial time to come into force, in part because many employers were initially 
unaware of the details of the new system. Particularly from the perspective of small 
and medium-sized firms, the experience-rating system was complex, and it was 
seemingly unimportant—as long as employers were not seeing a close connection 
between flows from their company into disability benefits and their employer-paid 
disability insurance premiums. Along similar lines, Hyatt and Thomason (1998) and 
others have argued that the awareness of experience rating among individual firms 
may be limited. Moreover, employer awareness of experience rating seemed espe-
cially low for firms who were benefitting from lower Disability Insurance premiums. 
To estimate the potential effect of experience rating, Koning (2009) 
employs a difference-in-differences strategy, looking at changes in registered 
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inflow rates to disability benefits for employers who had, versus had not, experi-
enced premium raises (so far). This strategy takes advantage of the rule that past 
inflow into disability benefits affected premiums with a lag of two years (as such, 
mean-reversion effects are controlled for). Following this approach, the response 
to an unanticipated increase in disability insurance premiums is estimated to be a 
15 percent decrease in the disability inflow rate. The experience-rating plan was 
thus effective for individual employers, but its macro-effect had to accumulate 
over time. Many employers still needed a “wake-up call” to pay attention to experi-
ence rating and subsequently increase activities that could prevent future sickness 
and disability.
While awareness of the experience-rating plan among employers has grown, 
criticism of experience rating has grown as well. This is not surprising, as the 
Netherlands stands out as the country with probably the highest experience-rating 
incentives relating to disability insurance in the world today. Employer organiza-
tions argue that they cannot bear the financial risks associated with experience 
rating, which, after all, are added to the sick-pay costs that were already there during 
the waiting period and also cover disability for nonoccupational reasons.3 Moreover, 
Dutch employers typically have no room to appeal the decision to award disability 
benefits (in the context of workers’ compensation claim decisions, there is usually 
room to appeal, as discussed in Tompa, Cullen, and McLeod 2012).
In this context, the most straightforward way for Dutch firms to circumvent 
experience-rating incentives in the Netherlands is to hire workers with temporary 
contracts. These individuals are sometimes labeled as “safety netters.” If tempo-
rary and flexible workers are awarded disability benefits, the costs are not assigned 
to individual employers but financed by collective funds. Thus, one would expect to 
see an increase in the share of temporary or flexible employment, particularly of 
high-risk workers with bad health conditions.
Although there is no causal evidence on the effect of experience rating on 
type of labor contract offered, a basic comparison of the rate of inflow to disability 
from workers with fixed and temporary contracts suggests that sorting effects have 
become more important. In particular, Figure 3 shows that the share of disability 
benefit awards to “safety netters” out of the total number of disability awards has 
increased from 42 percent in 2007 to 55 percent in 2011 (UWV 2013). This trend 
cannot be entirely explained by the (much smaller) decrease in the share of workers 
with permanent contracts; it rather suggests that vulnerable groups with bad health 
conditions have sorted into flexible jobs. Thus, although employers are not allowed 
to screen out workers with health conditions when doing permanent hires, one 
might doubt the enforceability of this law. This pattern raises concerns about the 
success of experience rating as well as the notion that employers should play a key 
3 To illustrate the implications of wage continuation and experience rating, suppose a worker becomes 
fully disabled; this means that the employer can become responsible for two years of full wages for this 
worker along with ten years of disability benefits.
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role in a program for the well-being of workers. We will return to this issue in the 
next sections.
Stricter Screening: The Gatekeeper Protocol (2002)
The introduction of the Gatekeeper protocol in 2002 is generally considered 
to be the most effective policy measure that has been taken to curb the rate of those 
receiving disability benefits. The Gatekeeper protocol specifies the legal respon-
sibilities of both the employer and the incapacitated worker during the period of 
sickness and absence before the worker applies for disability benefits. The protocol 
means that the social benefit administration (the UWV) is no longer involved in the 
process of reintegrating sick workers during the waiting period but acts purely as 
a gatekeeper.
The Gatekeeper protocol spells out the required behavior of employers and 
workers starting with the first weeks of absence from the job. In particular, after a 
maximum of six weeks of absence, the employer and worker should make a first 
assessment of medical cause and functional limitations. Based upon this assessment, 
they subsequently must draft a return-to-work plan within eight weeks of absence. 
This plan should include several dates to evaluate and modify the plan, if relevant. If 
the worker has not fully returned to work at the end of the waiting period, the worker 
Figure 3 
Workers in Flexible and Temporary Jobs Expressed as a Share of the Total 
Number of Insured and as a Share of DI Inflow (2007–2013)
Source: UWV (2013b).
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then files a disability benefit claim. Benefit claims are only considered admissible 
by the social benefit administration if they are accompanied by a return-to-work 
report, containing the original plan and an assessment as to why the plan has not 
(yet) resulted in work resumption. If the procedure was not followed, the employer 
may be obliged to continue providing sick pay for some additional months rather 
than having the worker transfer to disability benefits.4
In this way, the Gatekeeper protocol encourages the disability prevention 
and reintegration activities of employers. The protocol forces employers to focus 
their attention at the onset of sickness, when the opportunities for recovery and 
work resumption are probably most substantial. The stricter screening also triggers 
mechanisms of self-selection and self-screening among applicants with less-severe 
health conditions (Parsons 1991). So the protocol with its stricter screening involves 
stronger incentives—both for employers and workers.
The Gatekeeper protocol appears to have had an immediate impact on 
the behavior of employers and workers. For example, Figure  1, presented 
earlier, showed a sharp decrease in the percentage of the population receiving 
new disability insurance awards, from 1.4 percent of the insured population begin-
ning disability benefits in 2001 to 0.8 percent in 2004. The Gatekeeper protocol was 
the only reform that took place during this time.
Using quarterly data, van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2013) investigate the contri-
bution of the Gatekeeper protocol and some other measures on the decrease in 
disability inflow rates. They argue that these policies have reduced the disability 
award rates by about 40 percent, compared to the level prior to 2002. As this effect 
is far more substantial than the (immediate) impact of employer incentives, one 
could well argue that the Gatekeeper protocol has made the costs of wage continu-
ation and experience rating more salient to employers.
To shed more light on the mechanisms explaining the reduced inflow levels, 
de Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011) exploit a field experiment with 
regional variation of the intensity of screening by the social benefit administra-
tion. According to their analysis, stricter screening causes both self-selection and 
increased effort to resume work during sickness absenteeism—with both effects 
of about equal size. These mechanisms seem to have been strengthened when 
the mandatory waiting period of absence before receiving disability benefits was 
extended from one to two years in 2004. In our view, this extension of the manda-
tory waiting period is best understood not as a separate reform, but as part of the 
Gatekeeper protocol.
Although the Gatekeeper protocol seems to have contributed to the decrease 
in inflow rates to disability, there is concern that it may have had some unintended 
4 So far, the number of lawsuits that occur when employers and workers disagree on a return-to-work 
plan, or when plans are not executed, is limited. There are various reasons for this. First, employers face 
the risk of continued wage payments if there is no return-to-work plan. Second, workers can get fired by 
their employers if they do not cooperate. Third, mediators from the public employee insurance agency 
can be contacted in case of disagreements. Ultimately, if the employer and worker still disagree after this, 
a lawsuit may well occur.
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effects. First, one concern is that workers with less-severe health conditions have 
sorted into other social benefit schemes, with unemployment insurance as the most 
likely candidate. However, de Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011) find no 
evidence that increased gatekeeping by UWV resulted in more inflow into unem-
ployment insurance, suggesting that most workers who did not receive disability 
benefits under the Gatekeeper program resumed their work. Second, and similar 
to the enhancement of employer incentives prior to 2002, the protocol might have 
made employers more hesitant to hire workers who have a higher risk of bad health. 
We return to this issue at the end of this article.
2006: Tightening Eligibility Criteria and Increasing Work Incentives
The most recent disability insurance reforms entailed the replacement of the 
old Invalidity Insurance Act (“WAO” or Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering) by 
a new disability law called the Work and Income (Employment Capacity) Act that 
included new benefit conditions (“WIA” or Wet Werk en Inkomen naar Arbeidsvermogen). 
Although there was a widespread belief that the previous, inflow-related policy 
measures were effective in curbing inflow to disability benefits, policymakers felt 
that the program still was not effective in assisting disabled workers in reaching 
their full employment potential. The rates of recovery and work resumption for 
disabled workers were still negligible—although many of the impairments had 
been expected to be temporary. Therefore, to stimulate the work resumption of 
workers—particularly those with temporary and less-severe impairments—the new 
disability law included three major changes.
First, the new disability insurance program introduced the distinction between 
two types of benefits: one for workers who are fully and permanently disabled and 
one for workers who are partially and/or temporary disabled. For the group of fully 
and permanently disabled, disability benefits were raised to 75 percent of the last 
earned wage. Admission to this scheme has been very strict and limited to a selective 
group of impairments that are expected to be permanent. Consequently, the yearly 
inflow rate is only about 0.1 percent of the insured working population. The idea 
behind this distinction was that the room for moral hazard would be negligible for 
the small group of workers with severe and permanent impairments. Consequently, 
benefit levels could be increased and employers were no longer held financially 
responsible for this group.
Second, the eligibility criteria for the partial scheme have been tightened by 
raising the minimum degree of disability from 15 to 35 percent of the previously 
earned wage. Workers with less-severe health impairments are thus expected to 
continue their employment with some adaptations or—if they are fired—to apply 
for unemployment insurance. Figure 4 shows that this way of tightening Disability 
Insurance eligibility has led to a sharp increase in the number of claim denials since 
2006. This is mirrored by a decrease in the inflow into partial DI schemes that are 
awarded, while the inflow into full DI schemes has increased to some extent. In this 
respect, van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2013) argue that the higher disability threshold 
decreased disability insurance award rates by about 25 percentage points. Since its 
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inception in 2006, the reform is thus changing the composition of workers receiving 
disability benefits. By increasing the degree-of-disability thresholds in awarding 
benefits, the Netherlands system moves closer to that of other OECD countries, 
most of which have substantial thresholds.
Third, the new system introduced wage subsidies to encourage partially disabled 
workers to use their remaining earnings potential. Similar to the system before 2006, 
partially disabled individuals receive wage-related benefits that replace 70 percent 
of the difference between their pre-disability wage and their wage potential in the 
first years of their benefit. The length of this period is determined by their working 
history and lasts 38 months at maximum. After this period, however, workers only 
continue receiving this level of disability benefits if they work more than 50 percent 
of their residual earnings capacity. Otherwise, their benefit level is set equal to the 
level of social assistance.
There are strong reasons to believe that the introduction of the wage subsidy 
for partially disabled has had only a limited impact. Since 2006, only 29 percent 
Figure 4 
Inflow Rate into Disability Insurance and the Annual Number of Claim Denials, 
1999–2012
Source: UWV (2012).
Note: Here “fully disabled” is defined as a degree of disability higher than or equal to 80 percent, and 
“partially disabled” refers to workers with a disability degree below 80 percent.
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
1.0%
1999
2000
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
DI inow rate of fully
disabled workers
DI inow rate of 
partially disabled 
workers
Claim denial rate (%)
164     Journal of Economic Perspectives
of the disability awards consist of workers that are diagnosed as partially disabled. 
In addition, many collective bargaining agreements have provided nonstatutory 
benefits to offset the drop in statutory benefits in the follow-up period. One also 
should keep in mind that the targeted individuals have been out of the workforce 
for several years—starting with the waiting period of sick pay of two  years and 
followed by some years of benefits that are wage-related and do not inhibit strong 
work incentives. Similar to the experiences with the US Ticket-to-Work program, 
which also seeks to encourage the disabled to return to work, it is likely that the 
readiness to resume work has eroded during the period away from the workforce 
(Autor 2011).
Summing Up the Dutch Reforms
The key to the success of disability insurance reform in the Netherlands has 
been the intensified role of employers in preventing long-term sickness, absence, 
and subsequent disability, with a strong emphasis on early interventions. The 
employer incentives increased the economic urgency among employers to exert 
sickness and accident prevention and workforce reintegration activities, while the 
Gatekeeper protocol has facilitated employer awareness and guided employers in 
their new role. Most of the gains in curbing inflow to disability benefits have been 
made in the waiting period that precedes the application of claims.
The new disability law that started in 2006 has made a smaller but still substan-
tial contribution to the decreased inflow to disability benefits. The main effect 
came from a tightening of eligibility criteria, which caused fewer partially disabled 
workers to be awarded disability benefits. This probably has limited the ability of 
the new system to provide well-targeted and effective return-to-work incentives 
to the less-severely disabled.
One major concern with the reforms is the high level of obligations and financial 
risks born by employers. As a consequence, employers may now be more reluctant 
to hire vulnerable workers, in particular those with existing health conditions. In 
what follows, we will therefore consider the position of vulnerable worker groups: 
how did the reforms impact the structure of impairments that end up receiving 
disability benefits, and how have the employment probabilities of disabled workers 
evolved over time?
Labor Market Effects among Disabled Workers
Which Impairments Were Affected Most by the Reforms?
With reforms that focused on enhancing the screening for less-severe impair-
ments and encouraging re-entry to the workforce, one would expect major shifts 
in the composition of disability beneficiaries. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the 
percentage of awards by diagnosis groups. The reforms seem to have affected all 
broad impairment types, but to different degrees. The percentage of Disability 
Insurance recipients with musculoskeletal disorders per insured has almost halved 
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since 2002. This dramatic decrease largely coincides with a more general decrease 
in findings of partial disability. Individuals with less-severe impairments—for 
example, those with modest levels of lower back pain—have either resumed work 
in the two-year waiting period of sickness or did not meet the criteria of the new 
disability scheme.
The decrease in disability in the Netherlands has been accompanied by only 
a small reduction in the rate of disability awards due to mental disorders. Indeed, 
mental disorders made up 29.7 percent of the diagnoses for new disability enroll-
ment in 1998 but were 38.5 percent of the new diagnoses in 2012 (UWV 2012). 
This greater relative importance of mental disorders as a cause of disability is a 
trend that most OECD countries are facing, with some countries—like Sweden and 
Denmark—having even steeper increases in the share of disability awards due to 
mental disorders (OECD 2011). The high incidence of mental disorders among the 
disabled helps to explain why it has proven difficult to bring disabled workers back 
into the workforce. Those in this category are often labeled as “fully and tempo-
rarily” disabled, but in practice, the number of workers in this category that fully 
recover has proven to be negligible, and many of these individuals will eventually 
Figure 5 
Disability Insurance Enrollment Rate per Insured Worker, Stratified by Diagnosis 
Group (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2012)
Source: UWV (2012).
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transfer to the more generous scheme for permanently disabled individuals, rather 
than back to work.5
Figure 6 takes a closer look at the types of diagnoses that are made for disability 
applications in 2006, the first year of the new disability scheme. Three patterns in 
these data are worth noticing. First, almost all disability applications with muscu-
loskeletal disorders as the primary impairment—that is, lower back pain, chronic 
shoulder disorders, and hernia—are denied and virtually have no chance of being 
5 Of the temporary and fully disabled workers that entered the disability insurance system between 2006 
and 2010, only 14 percent have left the scheme (de Jong, Everhardt, and Schrijvershof 2013). These 
exits from the status of temporary and full disability include those who reach retirement age and those 
who are reclassified as permanently and fully disabled workers, along with those who have at least a 
partial recovery.
Figure 6 
Distribution of Most Important Diagnosis Groups across Disability Insurance 
Benefit Types and Application Denials in 2006
Source: UWV (2007).
Note: COPD is chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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awarded full and permanent benefits. Second, fully and temporarily disabled 
workers are an important group among the more severe mental disorders, like 
schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety disorders. Finally, only a few severe impair-
ments—such as stroke and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)—have 
a substantial probability of being qualified as fully and permanently disabled. Once 
more, this reflects the stringency of the new system.
When taking a broader perspective, Figure 6 also reveals that the largest share 
of benefits awarded are effectively experience-rated; it is only for workers with the 
most severe impairments that DI benefits costs are not borne by the employer. As the 
risk of these impairments is probably outside the control of the employer, this way of 
differentiating seems likely to be efficient. At the same time, one would expect the 
degree of experience rating to be highest for impairments that are related to work, 
particularly for musculoskeletal disorders. But since these physical impairments 
have the lowest probability of being awarded with benefits, the effective preventa-
tive impact of experience rating will be limited for this group.
Labor Supply Effects
The changes in the Dutch disability system, and in particular the changes of 
2006, aimed at stimulating work resumption rates of those with temporary and 
less-severe impairments. As disability enrollment rates have declined dramatically, 
the natural question that arises is whether these changes are accompanied by 
increases in employment rates of those with impairments relative to their healthy 
counterparts. To explore this issue, we use the POLS health survey from Statistics 
Netherlands (Permanent Onderzoek Leefsituatie) to describe trends in employment 
rates of those in good health versus those in bad health.6 The share of individuals 
between 25 and 65  years of age that report bad health is fairly constant around 
20 percent in all years in our sample.
Table 1 depicts differences in employment rates between individuals in bad and 
good health—labeled the “health employment gap”—for both men and women in 
the POLS data. These employment gaps can be substantial, ranging from 20 to 
about 30 percentage points of the sample. The figure shows for males a reduction 
in the health employment gap of about 5 percentage points since 2002. For females, 
the gap remains more or less constant over time. It should be noted that the different 
trend for females is in part due to increases in participation rates among healthy 
females as well. For men, however, participation rates among healthy individuals are 
almost constant over time.
With declining employment gaps for males, it becomes relevant to see whether 
this is reflected in differences in benefit receipt of any benefits between those in good 
6 The data are the Permanente Onderzoek Leefsituatie (POLS) data from 1998, 2002, and 2006 and the 
Gezondheidsenquête Health Survey of 2010. The POLS data consist of repeated cross-sections and come 
with sample weights that we use to construct our figures. Bad health is derived from the response to a 
question regarding an individual’s general health and equals one if the response is fair, bad, or very bad. 
Good health is defined as the complement of bad health (corresponding to a response of good or very 
good). Employment is defined as having a paid job and working more than 12 hours per week.
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health and bad health. Here, “benefit receipt” broadly includes disability benefits, 
unemployment benefits, social assistance (for those with low incomes) and early 
retirement benefits. To shed more light on this, Table 2 shows for males a drop of 
10 percentage points from 2002 to 2010. While there has been a general decline in 
benefit recipient rates of all men, the decline in benefit rates of those in poor health 
was of course considerably stronger. The 10 percentage point drop in the benefit 
gap between unhealthy and healthy men is larger than the about 5 percentage point 
reduction in the employment gap, implying that some of those who have left bene-
fits did not obtain “substantive gainful employment.” For women, one can observe 
a slight increase in the benefit receipt of those in bad health versus those in good 
health over the longer period from 1998 to 2010. Again, this may well stem from 
increases in participation rates of women in good health as well.
These descriptive analyses suggest that the Dutch Disability Insurance reforms 
probably enhanced the work continuation of male individuals with poor health. At 
the same time, however, the share of less-healthy males without work and receiving 
no benefits has increased as well. This finding could imply that some disabled people 
who are unable to work are being rejected for disability insurance, or that it has 
become harder for marginally healthy workers to claim disability benefits, or both.
Discussion and Outlook
The key to the success of Disability Insurance reform in the Netherlands has 
been the intensified role of employers in preventing long-term sickness, absence, 
and subsequent inflow to receipt of disability insurance benefits. The Gatekeeper 
protocol implemented in 2002 has provided employers guidance to implement 
Table 1 
Health and Employment of Males and Females (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010)
1998 2002 2006 2010
Males
 Employment rate of individuals with good health (%) 86.1 86.7 84.9 83.4
 Employment rate of individuals with bad health (%) 57.6 55.8 59.0 57.2
 Health employment gap (%) 28.5 30.9 25.9 26.2
Females
 Employment rate of individuals with good health (%) 56.4 65.5 68.9 71.0
 Employment rate of individuals with bad health (%) 35.1 35.7 40.6 40.0
 Health employment gap (%) 21.3 29.8 28.3 31.0
Source: POLS.
Note: The health employment gap is defined as the difference between the employment rates of 
individuals with good health and bad health, measured in percentage points.
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their new role, while the tighter eligibility criteria since 2006 seem to make the 
Dutch disability system less susceptible to providing disability benefits to those who 
can still work. These reforms probably have improved the targeting efficiency of 
the Dutch disability system, leading to higher employment rates among male indi-
viduals with both bad and good health. At the same time, however, the number of 
marginally healthy workers without benefits and without work has increased as well.
Given the decline in the rates at which disability benefits are being awarded 
each year, one might be inclined to think that the rates of people receiving disability 
as a share of the workforce will decline further in the years that come. However, the 
Dutch Disability Insurance system still includes some features that may undermine 
its long-term sustainability. In what follows, we will discuss two features that may have 
relevance for many other high-income countries: increased labor market flexibility 
and the inability of the program to get disabled workers to resume work—even for 
those whose impairments are temporary.
Changing Employer Incentives
The cornerstone of the current Dutch disability insurance system is the interest 
that employers should have in investing in the health and safety of their workers. 
However, this interest implicitly assumes long-standing or near-permanent employ-
ment contracts. In this context, some health problems accumulate over time and 
investments in workplace health and safety may take time to effectuate. With 
a continuous rise of flexible and temporary contracts, the case for sick pay costs 
and experience rating that stretch out over a long time window becomes weaker. 
Indeed, some argue that the financial risks of sickness and disability are too high for 
some firms, reducing the flexibility they need to adapt to labor market conditions.
Table 2 
Health and Benefit Receipt of Males and Females (1998, 2002, and 2010)
1998 2002 2010
Males
 Benefit rate for individuals with good health (%) 9.4 7.1 8.3
 Benefit rate for individuals with bad health (%) 47.8 46.9 38.1
 Health benefit gap (%) 38.4 39.8 29.8
Females
 Benefit rate individuals with good health (%) 9.8 8.4 7.7
 Benefit rate individuals with bad health (%) 34.4 37.6 36.9
 Health benefit gap (%) 24.6 29.2 29.2
Source: POLS.
Notes: The health benefit gap is defined as the difference between the benefit rates of 
individuals with bad health and good health, measured in percentage points. Here, “benefit” 
broadly includes disability benefits, unemployment benefits, social assistance (for those with 
low incomes), and early retirement benefits.
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As we argued earlier, it is likely that employers have responded to the incentives 
by hiring high-risk workers on a temporary basis only. One obvious policy response 
would be the introduction of employer-incentives-linked disability benefits for those 
hired on temporary and flexible contracts as well. Recently, the Dutch government 
decided to implement such plans beginning 2016: that is, employers will also be 
responsible for workers on temporary and flexible contracts both during the two-year 
waiting period of sick leave prior to the disability application and, given experience 
rating, after inflow into the disability system. This change will discourage substitu-
tion into temporary contracts, but serious doubts could be raised about the ability 
of employers to influence the risk of sickness and disability for many short-term and 
temporary workers.
Policymakers currently are also considering other ways of redesigning 
employer incentives to curb sickness and disability, searching for methods that 
would provide strong incentives but with lower financial risks for employers. The 
most likely candidate appears to be the adjustment of the experience rating of 
disability insurance premiums by somehow reducing the share of disability costs 
that would be passed back to the employer. Whether this could be done by means 
of a shorter time window for experience rating or a lower percentage payment is 
a question that calls for further research into the optimal design of incentives in 
this system.
Activating Disabled Workers
While the Dutch disability reforms have been successful in curbing inflow 
rates to disability benefits, the system has become less effective in enhancing and 
employing the residual work capacity of workers that are awarded benefits. This 
difficulty is not surprising, because a substantial group of workers with less-severe 
impairments is no longer eligible for disability benefits. Moreover, many of those 
diagnosed as temporarily and fully disabled are mentally impaired workers with low 
education levels (de Jong, Everhardt, and Schrijvershof 2013). Even in cases where 
one might expect these individuals to improve for medical reasons, the switch to 
substantial and gainful employment is only rarely observed.
One contributing explanation for the persistence of this area of disability can be 
found in the design of work incentives in the new scheme. At present, a fully disabled 
worker who finds partial employment will then have his or her level of disability 
reassessed. In addition, the switch from full to partial disability incurs the risk of not 
finding employment with sufficient earnings in order to receive the wage supple-
ment. In effect, the current setup of incentives thus effectively encourages fully and 
temporary disabled workers to abstain from work—even if their health recovers in a 
way that would allow them to regain part of their earnings potential. As we pointed 
out earlier, a related problem is that the incentive to return to work often arrives too 
late to make a difference, given how long individuals have already been out of the 
labor force. When putting this in a broader perspective, the question arises whether 
the Dutch Disability Insurance program puts too much emphasis on employer incen-
tives while the effectiveness of worker incentives is still limited.
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Closing Remarks
Workers with poor health and low productivity levels are a vulnerable group 
in the labor market and will pose a challenge for policymakers in any country that 
provides disability benefits. Because the definition of disability depends explicitly 
on the job opportunities of workers, there always will be beneficiaries of disability 
payments who are capable of working but insufficiently productive to earn their 
own living (see also Autor and Duggan 2006). This particularly holds for countries 
where statutory minimum wages are relatively high—such as the Netherlands, as 
well as Sweden and Norway—resulting in more limited opportunities for (formerly) 
disabled workers to resume work. There is inevitably a group of workers for whom 
early interventions do not hold much promise and for whom working is not viable—
whether these workers are classified as disabled or not.
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